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that even an expansive finance-led economy may build up major financial imbalances, i.e. 
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# We have benefited from discussions with the participants of the workshop ‘Financialisation: Post Keynesian 
Approaches’ at the University of Lille 1 in April 2008 and from helpful comments by Thomas Dallery on an 
earlier version of this paper. We alone are responsible for remaining errors.   1
1. Introduction 
The recent decades have seen major changes in the financial sectors of developed and devel-
oping countries.
1 Generally, we have observed a rapid development of new financial instru-
ments, triggered by national and international legal liberalisation and by the development of 
new communication technologies. The overall importance of financial factors for distribution, 
consumption, investment and growth seems to have increased considerably. These develop-
ments and the related consequences and effects have been broadly summarised as ‘financiali-
sation’ by some authors (Epstein, 2005; Krippner, 2005; Lavoie, 2008; Palley, 2008; 
Skott/Ryoo, 2008a,b; Stockhammer, 2004; van Treeck, 2007, 2008b).
2 However, a major part 
of this literature remains somewhat opaque when it comes to the precise meaning of ‘finan-
cialisation’. Epstein (2005, p. 3), for example, argues rather broadly that ‘[…] financialization 
means the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and finan-
cial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies’. In the present 
chapter we start with a more precise meaning and analytical definition of what ‘financialisa-
tion’ is all about. This will help us then to review recent attempts to incorporate these devel-
opments into Post-Keynesian models of distribution and growth in a systematic way.  
Seen from a Post-Keynesian macroeconomic perspective, and limiting our attention to 
closed private economies, we suggest that ‘financialisation’ has the following potential impli-
cations:
3
                                                 
1 See for example the overview in Eatwell/Taylor (2000) for an early analysis, Krippner (2005) and the contribu-
tions in Epstein (2005) for a detailed treatment of the development in the US and other countries, van 
Treeck/Hein/Dünhaupt (2007) and van Treeck (2008a) for a comparison of the macroeconomics of ‘financialisa-
tion’ in the US and Germany, and Stockhammer (2007) for the development in Europe. 
2 Other authors have used different terms, with sometimes different meanings: ‘finance-led growth regime’ 
(Boyer, 2000), ‘financial wealth-induced growth regime’ (Aglietta, 2000), ‘finance-led economies’ (van Treeck, 
2008a), ‘finance-dominated regime’ (Stockhammer, 2007)‚ ‘neo-liberalism’ (Duménil/Levy, 2005), ‘shareholder 
value orientation’ (Hein, 2008b; Stockhammer, 2005-6), ‘maximizing shareholder value’ (Lazonick/O’Sullivan, 
2000), or ‘rising shareholder power’ (Hein, 2008c). 
3 Whereas the earlier Post-Keynesian and Kaleckian models of distribution and growth were missing an explicit 
introduction of monetary and financial variables at all, with the exception of Pasinetti’s (1974, pp. 139-141) 
natural rate of growth models, these variables have been introduced into those models since the late 1980s/early 
1990s by different authors. However, the focus in these models has mainly been on the introduction of the rate of 
interest, as an exogenous distribution parameter determined by central bank policies, and bank credit, created   2
1. Both the objectives and the constraints of firms as a whole may be affected. On the one 
hand, increasing shareholder power will subordinate managements’ and workers’ preference 
for (long-run) accumulation of the firm to shareholders’ preference for (short-term) profitabil-
ity. On the other, increasing dividend payments, share buybacks etc. will restrict the availabil-
ity of finance for firms’ investment projects.  
2. New opportunities (and longer term risks) for households in terms of wealth-based and 
debt-financed consumption may arise. The reasons for this are financial asset price booms 
associated with shareholder value orientation of firms, on the one hand, and new credit in-
struments made available to households by profit-seeking banks, on the other hand. 
3. Distribution of income may be affected due to changes in power relations between share-
holders, managers and workers. Distribution effects will then feed back on investment and 
consumption. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In the second section we draw on 
the existing literature in order to develop a general Post-Keynesian framework for the analysis 
of ‘financialisation’. In particular, we attempt to coherently link the microeconomic founda-
tions of shareholder value orientation at the firm level with the possible macroeconomic out-
comes. In the third section, we discuss different possible ‘regimes’, showing why financialisa-
tion may have either contractive or expansive effects, as well as some stock-flow and finan-
cial fragility and instability issues. The fourth section summarises and concludes this review. 
 
2. A general Post-Keynesian framework for the analysis of ‘financialisation’  
2.1 ‘Financialisation’ and the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm 
In the traditional Post-Keynesian theory of the firm, rentiers are seen as playing only a minor 
role for corporate governance. The typical Post-Keynesian firm is the large corporation, oper-
ating in imperfectly competitive markets (Eichner’s (1976) ‘megacorp’). The main interest of 
                                                                                                                                                         
endogenously by a developed banking sector on demand by creditworthy borrowers. See the surveys by, among 
others, Hein (2008a), Lavoie (1992, pp. 347-371, 1995), and Taylor (2004, pp. 272-278).   3
the management of such firms (Galbraith’s (1967) ‘technostructure’) has traditionally been 
seen to be the growth of the firm, subject to only loose profitability constraints enforced by 
owners. In light of recent developments in financial markets and corporate governance, this 
Post-Keynesian theory of the firm needs to be reconsidered.
4
More recently, Post-Keynesians, such as Crotty (1990), Dallery (2008), or Stockhammer 
(2005-6), have highlighted the importance of the ‘owner-manager conflict’ inherent to large 
corporations. This conflict arises from the postulation of a ‘growth-profit trade-off’, implying 
that shareholder value orientation is likely to be associated with a high preference for short-
term profitability and with a low propensity to invest in real capital stock by firms. Due to 
diversified portfolios, ‘stockholders typically have only a fleeting relation with any particular 
enterprise’ (Crotty, 1990, p. 534) and care much more about the current profitability than the 
long-term expansion and survival of a particular firm.
5 In fact, with ‘financialisation’, various 
mechanisms have been designed to, on the one hand, impose restrictions on managements’ 
ability to seek expansion, and, on the other hand, change managements’ preferences them-
selves and align them to shareholders’ profit maximisation objective. Managements’ desire 
for growth is nowadays contained through, in particular, higher dividend payouts demanded 
by shareholders, a weaker ability of firms to obtain new equity finance through stock issues 
(which tend to decrease share prices), a larger dependence on leverage, and an increased 
threat of hostile takeovers in a liberalised market for corporate control. Simultaneously, finan-
cial market-oriented remuneration schemes have been developed to align management prefer-
ences to shareholders’ objectives. As an overall result, it has been argued that the traditional 
                                                 
4 For a review of the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm, as developed by, amongst others, Galbraith (1967), 
Eichner (1976), and Wood (1975), see Lavoie (1992, pp. 94-118), who could argue as lately as 1992 that: 
‘Whether the owners are still in control or not is irrelevant: those individuals taking decisions within the firm are 
in search of power; and their behaviour and motivations will reflect that fundamental fact’ (Lavoie, 1992, p. 
102).  
5 In the New Institutional Economics literature, the ‘owner-manager conflict’ is interpreted as a principle-agent 
problem opposing shareholders and managers. Here, however, the focus is not primarily on managers’ prefer-
ence for growth and on the related effects on aggregate demand, but on managements’ shirking and interest in 
‘benefits in kind’, such as ‘physical appointments of the office’, the ‘attractiveness of the secretarial staff’, or ‘a 
larger than optimal computer to play with’ (Jensen/Meckling, 1976, p. 312).   4
managerial policy ‘retain and invest’ is replaced by the shareholder-oriented strategy ‘down-
size and distribute’ (Lazonick/O’Sullivan, 2000).  
 





















Graphically, these new developments can be analysed on the basis of Figure 1. The lines 
given by FFi reflect different finance constraints faced by the managers of the firm in their 
investment decision. These finance frontiers indicate the maximum rate of accumulation (g) 
that firms can finance with a given profit rate (r). Seen from a different angle, they determine 
the profit rate that is necessary for firms to be able to finance the desired accumulation rate. 
The finance frontier can be derived algebraically as follows. Notice first that investment (I) 
can be financed either by retained earnings or by external finance: 
(1)    () I x I x K i s I s b b b f + + − Π =
with Π as profits, sf as the share of retained profits in profits net of interest payments (reten-
tion ratio), ib as the interest rate paid by firms, Kb as firms’ outstanding bonds or loans, and 
 and   respectively as the proportions of investment financed by bond issues/bank credit 
and equity issues. Defining the profit rate as r = Π/K, and the leverage ratio as LEV = K
b x s x
b/K, 
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This implies that for a given profit rate (r) managers can finance a higher accumulation rate, 
the lower are dividend payments and interest obligations and the higher is the proportion of 
externally financed investment that is tolerated by creditors as well as the firm itself under 
conditions of asymmetric information, considering Kalecki’s (1937) ‘principle of increasing 
risk’. Graphically, if creditors and/or firms tolerate a higher proportion of investment financed 
by external means [ ( ) 0 x x 1 b s < − − Δ ] and/or the leverage ratio, the interest rate or the divi-
dend payout ratio declines (  or  0 sf > Δ 0 LEV ib < Δ ), the firm’s finance frontier in Figure 1 
rotates clockwise and shifts downwards. 
The second constraint faced by managers is the expansion frontier (EF). It indicates the 
profit rate that can be realised with a particular growth strategy. The expansion frontier is as-
sumed to be upward sloping for low accumulation rates (due to economies of scale and scope, 
etc.), and downward sloping for higher rates (due to technical and logistical inefficiencies, 
etc.) (Lavoie, 1992, pp. 114-116). 
In the traditional Post-Keynesian analysis of the firm, the accumulation decision is deter-
mined by the point of intersection of the finance frontier and the expansion frontier (Lavoie 
1992, p. 117). In this view, firms are interested in the profit rate only insofar as a higher profit 
rate eases the finance constraint and hence allows for faster expansion. As suggested by 
Lavoie (1992, p. 106): ‘Put briefly, growth is the objective, and profits are the means to real-
ize this objective.’ In contrast, with ‘financialisation’ it seems more appropriate to consider 
the possibility that the desired accumulation rate, given by preferences, is below the maxi-
mum rate, given by the finance constraint: ‘profits are no longer a mean to an end, but they 
become an end in itself’ (Dallery, 2008, p. 4). Therefore, Figure 1 is completed by a set of 
indifference curves, Ui, reflecting different preferences of managers faced with the growth-  6
profitability trade-off in the downward-sloping segment of the expansion frontier (see also 
Dallery, 2008; Stockhammer, 2005-6).
6
With higher shareholder value orientation, one may expect two things to happen: 
1.) Shareholders impose a higher distribution of profits by firms:  0 sf < Δ  (higher dividend 
payout ratio and hence lower rentention ratio) and  0 xs < Δ  (lower contribution of new eq-
uity issues to the financing of investment, or share buybacks). 
2.) Managers’ (firms’) preference for growth is weakened as a result of remuneration 
schemes based on short-term profitability and financial market results. 
The first effect will imply a counter-clockwise rotation and an upward shift of the finance 
frontier in Figure 1. These movements may even be more pronounced in the longer run, be-
cause the leverage ratio may increase as a result of lower profit retention and lower equity 
issues. This, however, can be expected to further reduce firms’ ability to secure external 
means of finance. The second effect can be represented in Figure 1 as a flattening of the indif-
ference curve.  
Starting from a situation (point A) in which shareholders’ influence on the firm’s prefer-
ences is very weak (U0) and the firm’s accumulation decision are restricted only by a rela-
tively loose finance constraint (FF0), the effects of increasing shareholder value orientation 
can be interpreted as follows. The new accumulation decision will be determined either by the 
new preferences alone (U2 with FF0 or FF1 (point C) or U1 with FF0 (point B)), or by the new 
finance constraint alone (U0 with FF1 (point B) or U0 or U1 with FF2 (point C)), or by prefer-
ences fully compatible with constraints (U1 with FF1 (point B) or U2 with FF2 (point C)). 
Note that when the finance constraint remains binding (U1 with FF2), shareholders are not 
able to impose their preferred investment strategy as a result of a shareholder-creditor con-
                                                 
6 One may also interpret the indifference curves as reflecting the preferences of the firm as a whole, determined 
by a compromise between shareholders and managers.   7
flict, with banks refusing to provide the required amount of credit necessary to realise share-
holders’ claims in terms of both profit distribution and investment policy.  
 
2.2 ‘Financialisation’ and aggregate demand 
The growth-profitability trade-off postulated at the firm level in the previous subsection does 
not simply carry over to the macroeconomic level. Here, a lower accumulation rate leads to a 
lower profit rate, ceteris paribus. This is clearly expressed in the macroeconomic profit equa-
tion stressed by Kalecki (1954, pp. 45-52) and also follows strictly from national accounting:  
(3)  .  W S C I − + = Π Π
In a closed private economy, profits must always be exactly equal to investment plus con-
sumption out of profits minus saving out of wages. When many firms attempt to move to the 
left along their individual expansion frontiers, they will experience a downward shift of these 
expansion frontiers, due to the adverse aggregate demand effect. This fallacy of composition 
seems to be neglected in much of the political economy and even macroeconomics literature 
on ‘financialisation’ (see Skott/Ryoo, 2008a, and van Treeck, 2008b, for a critique). In what 
follows, we develop a general framework describing the macroeconomic implications of ‘fi-
nancialisation’ in terms of private investment and consumption decisions.  
Equation (4) is a general investment function, relating net investment to the capital stock: 
(4)  q u LEV r
K
I
g 4 3 2 sf 1 0
i γ + γ + γ − γ − γ = = , 
where rsf is a profitability target of firms, LEV is the leverage ratio, as before, u is the rate of 
capacity utilisation, and q = (Kb + Ks)/K is Tobin’s q, with Ks being stock market capitalisa-
tion. The term  sf 1r γ −  expresses the degree to which (shareholders’) profitability targets affect 
firms’ investment decisions: It can be seen as based on a set of indifference curves along a 
linearised downward sloping expansion frontier in terms of Figure 1. Similarly, the term 
LEV 2 γ −  proxies the degree to which investment is finance constraint, because firms’ access   8
to external means of finance is negatively and interest obligations are positively related to the 
leverage ratio.
7 In terms of Figure 1, the points of intersection between a linear expansion 
frontier and a set of finance constraints also yield a downward sloping line in the r-g space. 
The rate of capacity utilisation and Tobin’s q are proxies of current and expected demand and 
profitability conditions faced by firms. In Figure 1, an increase in either of these variables can 
be represented as an upward shift of the expansion frontier. For a given u and q, the accumu-
lation policy of an individual firm is hence determined by either its preferences or the finance 
constraint, as argued above. Financial asset prices, and hence Tobin’s q, are jointly deter-
mined by firms’ financing decisions and households’ portfolio choice, which are not modelled 
explicitly here.
8
Equation (4) encompasses various views on the effects of shareholder value orientation 
that can be found in the literature. Some authors, such as Boyer (2000), Cordonnier/Van de 
Velde (2008), Firmin (2008), and Stockhammer (2004, 2005-6), have focused on the effects 
on firms’ preferences in terms of the growth profit trade-off. In terms of Figure 1, as rsf [the 
‘financial norm’ in Boyer (2000)] increases, the indifference curve representing firms’ prefer-
ences becomes flatter and firms wish to move to the left along the expansion frontier. Other 
authors have emphasised the financial effects of shareholder value orientation, based on the 
idea that a higher rate of distributed profits reduces managers’ ability to invest (Hein, 2006, 
2007; Lavoie, 1995, 2008; Ndikumana, 1999; van Treeck, 2007). Finally, some authors have 
considered both effects to be relevant (Dallery/van Treeck, 2008; Hein, 2008b,c; Skott/Ryoo, 
2008a). In our view, for the business sector as a whole, it seems plausible to assume non-zero 
coefficients on both the financial norm set by shareholders and on distributed profits, imply-
                                                 
7 Many authors include also the rate of retained profits, given by sf(r-ibLEV), in the investment function (e.g. 
recently Lavoie/Godley, 2001-2; Ndikumana, 1999; Skott/Ryoo, 2008a,b; van Treeck, 2007). Here we wish to 
keep things simple and to explicitly ground the investment function in the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm as 
exposed in Figure 1. While the leverage ratio affects only the finance constraint, the rate of retained profits is 
also directly influenced by aggregate demand, which also affects the position of the individual firm’s expansion 
frontier. Note that with our chosen specification an increase in the dividend-payout ratio will have only an indi-
rect negative effect on investment through an increase in the leverage ratio.  
8 See Godley/Lavoie (2007) for the integration of financial decisions of firms and households in stock-flow con-
sistent models. In these models, q =1 is not an equilibrium condition.   9
ing that accumulation may be restricted exclusively by preferences in some firms, and by fi-
nancing constraints in others. Also, in practice, it may be almost impossible to clearly distin-
guish between preferences and constraints: As shareholder value orientation of management 
increases, their preference for profitability (linked to performance-oriented remuneration 
schemes) should increase together with their propensity to distribute profits, which may then 
further restrict investment decisions from the financing side.  
The role of Tobin’s q in the investment function is very controversial. In some models, it 
plays a crucial role allowing for positive effects of shareholder value orientation on accumula-
tion (Skott/Ryoo, 2008a,b; van Treeck, 2007). In others, it is explicitly excluded from the in-
vestment function because it is argued that when firms themselves intervene in the stock mar-
ket (e.g. by buying back shares), the resulting increase in Tobin’s q will not be taken by them 
as a signal to invest more (Hein, 2008c; and the discussion and literature review in van 
Treeck, 2007).  
A general saving function can be formulated as follows: 
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It is assumed that there is no saving out of wage income. Saving in relation to the capital stock 
(g
s) is therefore determined by firms’ retained profits and saving out of profits distributed to 
creditors and shareholders:  () ( ) [ ] LEV i LEV i r s 1 r b b f 1 + − − β − . Saving may be reduced if con-
sumption out of financial wealth (q) and out of new loans granted to workers (∆Lw) and to 
rentiers (∆Lr), each relative to the capital stock, is included. Net new loans are granted to 
workers and rentiers respectively on the basis of wage (W) or profit (Π) income, financial   10
wealth, outstanding loans, the interest rate on personal loans (il), and the rate of loan repay-
ment (rep).  
Equation (5) encompasses different views of ‘financialisation’ in terms of its implications 
for private consumption. In a pure flow model, Cordonnier (2006) argues that when firms 
increase dividend payments at the expense of accumulation, the macroeconomic profit rate 
may nevertheless increase, provided that shareholders have a large propensity to consume out 
of distributed profits, given by β1 in the saving function above (see also Hein, 2008b,c; Van 
de Velde, 2005, p. 184; van Treeck, 2008a). The likelihood of such a scenario increases fur-
ther, when also the potentially positive effects of higher financial wealth on consumption are 
taken into account (β2 > 0), as in Boyer (2000), Lavoie/Godley (2001-2), Skott/Ryoo 
(2008a,b), or van Treeck (2007). Finally, debt-financing of consumption (β3 > 0 and/or β4 > 0) 
is a further channel facilitating the divorce of profits and investment at the macroeconomic 
level. However, some authors have pointed at the potentially longer-term risks of debt-
financed consumption. In particular, Bhaduri/Laski/Riese (2006) recall that a positive wealth 
effect, if it is to operate, also implies rising personal indebtedness, because financial wealth is 
by definition notional and cannot be realised at a macroeconomic scale. However, although 
rising wealth initially increases households’ collateral, allowing for an expansion of credit 
[ ], the accumulation of debt may, in the longer run, undermine households’ 
creditworthiness and increase their burden of debt servicing, forcing them to increase saving 
again [ ]. In a somewhat different vein, Dutt (2005, 2006) emphasises the 
distributional effects of credit-financing of consumption by workers. While the initial effects 
are clearly expansive [upward shift in  ], in the longer run, as workers 
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workers towards rentiers, which causes the overall personal saving rate to rise. Palley (1996) 
has also analysed such conflicting effects of credit and debt over the business cycle.  
Finally, the effects of ‘financialisation’ on income distribution can be specified with the 
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where h is the profit share, and m is firms’ mark-up. It says that firms attempt to pass through 
higher profitability requirements as well as the drain of retained profits (higher dividend pay-
outs and share buybacks) imposed by rentiers on workers by means of increasing the mark-up 
in goods market pricing. Such mechanisms have been discussed by e.g. Boyer (2000), 
Dallery/van Treeck (2008), Hein (2008b,c), and Palley (2008). Furthermore, Lavoie (2006) 
and Palley (2006) consider the effects of ‘cadrisme’, implying an increasingly unequal distri-
bution of white collar, or management, wages and blue collar wages. In our view, as man-
agement’s remuneration is increasingly pegged to firms’ financial results, it is nowadays in-
creasingly of the nature of profit income rather than ordinary wage income.  
 
3. Different ‘regimes’ 
Elsewhere, we have developed and solved full macroeconomic models of ‘financialisation’ 
(Hein, 2008b,c; van Treeck, 2007). Here, we just summarise in an informal way the potential 
overall effects of ‘financialisation’ in the general framework outlined above. In Figure 2 we 
illustrate potential macroeconomic effects of a) increasing shareholder value orientation of 
firms, which means a higher profitability norm, a larger dividend payout ratio, and a lower 
rate of equity issues, and b) easier access to credit for private households, i.e. rentiers as well 
as workers. As can be seen in Figure 2, the effects of ‘financialisation’ on the endogenous 
variables of the model are ambiguous throughout, and different authors have therefore come 
to different conclusions regarding the macroeconomic effects of ‘financialisation’.   12
Figure 2: ‘Financialisation’, income distribution and aggregate demand 
a)  Shareholder value orientation, investment and saving 



















3.1 Macroeconomic effects of changes in firms’ preferences 
The upper left part of Figure 2 describes the effects of a higher profitability norm. In terms of 
Figure 1, the individual firm attempts to move leftwards along its expansion frontier. How-
ever, in the absence of compensating macroeconomic forces (i.e. impacting on the saving 
function), the resulting decline in accumulation will clearly be contractive and induce a de-  13
crease, not an increase, in firms’ profit rates. This fundamental micro-macro divide has been 
recalled by, amongst others, Cordonnier (2006), Cordonnier/Van de Velde (2008), Dallery 
(2008), Firmin (2008), Hein (2008b,c), Skott/Ryoo (2008a), van Treeck (2008a,b). 
Some authors have, however, argued that there may indeed be important macroeconomic 
forces that may allow shareholders to realise their microeconomic objectives. One widely 
noticed attempt in this direction has been made by Boyer (2000) in his analysis of the viability 
of a ‘finance-led growth regime’. In this model, when employees are assumed to be ‘clearly 
aware of the favourable effect of wage restraint on their wealth’ (Boyer, 2000, p. 125), an 
increase in the financial norm may have overall expansive macroeconomic effects, due to the 
stimulating impact of higher financial wealth on consumption, and despite the direct negative 
effect in the investment function, as well as the indirect negative effect on consumption via 
the redistribution of income from wages to profits. Yet, Boyer’s (2000) model is incomplete 
in a number of respects, and it is not clear, for instance, how exactly a change in the financial 
norm affects financial wealth (Tobin’s q is assumed to be constant in his model, and wealth is 
calculated on the basis of Tobin’s q, profits and the interest rate) (see Skott/Ryoo, 2008a, and 
van Treeck, 2008b, for a critique). In a full macroeconomic model, one would have to model 
financial wealth (or Tobin’s q) as the result of households’ saving and portfolio decisions as 
well as firms’ financing decisions. In the framework developed above, an increase in the fi-
nancial norm can only be expansionary, if it is linked to an increase in the profit share which 
then, via its effect on saving, stimulates Tobin’s q and thereby investment (Figure 2a).
9  
A further mechanism that may countervail the depressive impact of larger profitability 
claims by shareholders has been analysed by Dallery/van Treeck (2008). They argue that 
when managers realise that the increased profitability claims are not being met, they may have 
incentives to buy back shares and/or to distribute higher dividends in order to satisfy share-
holders. Paradoxically, this may then stimulate profitability, utilisation and accumulation, due 
                                                 
9 Another possibility would be that a higher financial norm increases households’ preference for equities and 
hence Tobin’s q and accumulation and consumption.   14
to rentiers’ consumption out of capital income and wealth, and shareholders’ microeconomic 
claims may hence eventually be realised at the macroeconomic level, provided that banks 
accept the associated increase in firms’ indebtedness. A similar approach has been chosen by 
Cordonnier (2006), who also considers the possibility that a higher preference for profitability 
will be accompanied by higher dividend payments. Yet, according to this view, there is no 
direct causal relationship between dividend payments and investment, because dividend pay-
ments are not seen as a restriction, but rather as the result of shareholders demanding manag-
ers to distribute those profits which are not ‘needed’, given the preferred investment strategy. 
However, as argued above on the basis of Figure 1, dividend payments and share buybacks 
also worsen firms’ financial position and may therefore further affect investment adversely. 
This mechanism is discussed in the next section. 
 
3.2 Macroeconomic effects of changes in financial constraints faced by firms 
Some authors have discussed the effects of shareholder value orientation in terms of its impli-
cations for firms’ financing constraints. Some of these works are extensions of Post-
Keynesian growth models incorporating the impact of interest payments on investment and 
consumption (Lavoie, 1995; Lavoie/Godley, 2001-2; Hein, 2006, 2007, 2008b,c; Skott/Ryoo, 
2008a,b; van Treeck, 2007). Here, we discuss the effects of an increasing dividend payout 
ratio (∆sf < 0) and of a reduction in the contribution of new equity issues to the financing of 
investment (∆xs < 0) (Figure 2a). The two effects are essentially similar: both a higher divi-
dend payout ratio, and hence a decreasing retention ratio, and share buybacks tend to increase 
firms’ dependence on debt (higher leverage
10), but they also stimulate share prices and 
Tobin’s q because of larger household saving in both cases and lower stock of equities in the 
case of share buybacks. Some authors (Hein 2008b,c; Palley, 2008; van Treeck, 2007), have 
                                                 
10 In Hein (2008c), however, a higher dividend rate is not necessarily associated with a higher equilibrium lever-
age ratio. In his stable (puzzling) case, the leverage ratio may actually decline, when its initial value is already 
large. In the unstable (normal) case, the equilibrium value of the leverage ratio will decline, but the actual value 
will increase and explode due to a cumulative disequilibrium process.   15
also argued that a decrease in firms’ retention ratio may lead to an increase in the profit share, 
as firms attempt to pass through higher dividend payments and financing costs to workers. 
Then, the overall effects on growth will be ambiguous, depending on the relative strengths of 
various partial effects (see Figure 2): The negative impact of higher leverage and a lower re-
tention ratio on accumulation (via the finance frontier in terms of Figure 1); the positive effect 
of higher Tobin’s q on accumulation (upward shift of the expansion frontier in Figure 1); the 
negative effect of a higher profit share on consumption; and the positive effect of higher fi-
nancial wealth on consumption (directly and indirectly via the increase in collateral and 
household borrowing).  
Therefore, it comes with no surprise that different authors have come to different conclu-
sions regarding the overall impact of more shareholder-friendly financing decisions by firms. 
Lavoie/Godley (2001-2) find, in a stock-flow consistent (SFC) model, that both a lower reten-
tion rate and lower equity issues have expansive effects with their chosen model specification 
and parameter values. Skott/Ryoo (2008a,b) come to the same conclusion, and also provide a 
general analytical treatment: They conclude that for systems with relatively ‘inelastic stock-
flow ratios’ (financial wealth-to-income ratios), the effects of higher dividends and lower eq-
uity issues can be expected to be expansive, while in the case of ‘elastic stock-flow ratios’, the 
results may be contractive.
11 They also argue that it is empirically more plausible to assume 
stock-flow inelastic systems. Somewhat different results have been derived by Hein (2008c) 
and van Treeck (2007), who distinguish between contractive (‘normal’), intermediate, and 
expansive (‘puzzling’) cases, following Lavoie’s (1995) discussion of the ambiguous effects 
of increases in the interest rate on the rates of capacity utilisation, profit, and accumulation. In 
the contractive (expansive) case, the endogenous variables are negatively (positively) affected 
                                                 
11 Skott/Ryoo (2008 a,b) distinguish between Harrodian and Kaleckian economies with and without labour con-
straints. In the Harrodian labour constraint case, the expansive effects of higher dividend payments and share 
buybacks on growth occur only in the short run, but in the long run investment decisions are adjusted such that 
the economy grows at a rate given by the growth rate of labour supply. The postulated adjustment mechanism is 
a deterioration of firms’ animal spirits in the face of increasing workers’ militancy triggered by low unemploy-
ment.    16
throughout, while in the intermediate case the accumulation rate declines while the rates of 
capacity utilisation and profit increase, which corresponds to Cordonnier’s (2006) ‘profits 
without investment’ and Stockhammer’s (2005-6) ‘investment-profit puzzle’. The somewhat 
more complex model by Godley/Lavoie (2007, chapter 11, pp. 435-439) and the experiments 
based on this model by Lavoie (2008) also show contractive results: An increase in the target 
proportion of investment financed by retained earnings, corresponding to a decrease in the 
proportion of investment financed by new equity issues, has negative effects on economic 
activity and growth, because it increases firms’ costing margins and conflict inflation, and it 
decreases real wages. Although Tobin’s q is rising, this does not impact on investment in this 
model. In Lavoie (2008), an increase in the fraction of profits distributed as dividends has 
negative effects on output and employment for the same reasons: firms’ target costing margin 
and conflict inflation increases, real wages decline and the increase in Tobin’s q has no posi-
tive feedback effect on investment.  
As discussed by Hein (2008c), Skott/Ryoo (2008a,b), and van Treeck (2007), the overall 
results depend crucially on the coefficients attached to the leverage ratio and Tobin’s q in the 
investment function and to the wealth effect in the consumption function. The plausibility of 
the different regimes is thus an empirical matter. While Skott/Ryoo see wealth effects on in-
vestment and consumption as empirically important, Hein and van Treeck argue that Tobin’s 
q may be an unreliable indicator for investment decisions, when firms intervene themselves in 
the stock market and, for instance, actively reduce the supply of equities.
12 Also, while it is 
acknowledged that the wealth effect on consumption has been empirically very important in 
some countries (in particular in the US), they maintain that this is less the case in other coun-
tries (e.g. continental Europe) and argue that an initially wealth- and credit-driven system may 
                                                 
12 See Medlen (2003) for empirical support for our doubts. According to his observations there is a positive cor-
relation between Tobin’s q, on the one hand, and the relationship between mergers to new real investment, on the 
other hand, the exact opposite of what Tobin’s q would suggest. Generally, empirical studies have difficulties in 
finding a statistically significant and empirically relevant effect of Tobin’s q on investment. See, for example, 
Bhaskar/Glyn (1995), Chirinko (1993), and Ndikumana (1999).   17
eventually come to an end, when it is linked to rising corporate and personal debt ratios. In the 
terminology applied by Taylor (2004), an initially ‘debt-led’ system may eventually become 
‘debt-burdened’. 
In the end, however, it seems that there is widespread agreement that shareholder value 
orientation potentially has overall contractive effects, when its implications for both firms’ 
preferences and financing constraints are taken together (see e.g. the concluding discussion in 
Skott/Ryoo, 2008a). 
 
3.3 Macroeconomic effects of easier access to credit for private households 
In Figure 2b, some potential implications of easier access to credit for private households are 
discussed. The reasons behind the ambiguous effects of increased borrowing opportunities are 
linked to the interaction between (the flow of) credit and (the stock of) debt. An increase in 
household borrowing is initially expansive because it stimulates consumption. In the longer 
run, however, debt servicing obligations increase and tend to depress consumer spending. 
Bhaduri/Laski/Riese (2006) even consider the possibility of a negative wealth effect on con-
sumption, which is based on the idea that the wealth effect can only operate through increases 
in household debt, because notional wealth cannot be realised collectively but only serve as 
collateral for consumers.  
Note that the magnitude of the conflicting flow and stock effects of higher debt will be 
particularly large when lower income households (workers) increase their borrowing (∆Lw > 
0) and are assumed to have a higher marginal propensity to consume (MPC) than higher in-
come households (rentiers). As emphasised by Palley (1996, p. 202) in an early contribution:  
‘increases in debt initially stimulate aggregate demand by transferring spending power from 
creditors to debtors, but the interest payments on accumulated debt stocks become a burden 
on aggregate demand since they transfer income from high MPC households to low MPC   18
households’ (see also Palley, 1994). Dutt (2006) has confirmed this mechanism in a growth 
context.  
 
3.4 ‘Financialisation’ and macroeconomic instability 
It would be beyond the scope of this review to extensively discuss the literature on financial 
fragility. Here, we only briefly touch the issue of macroeconomic instability potentially linked 
to ‘financialisation’.  
To begin with, as argued above, both shareholder value orientation and the deregulation of 
credit markets are likely to contribute to rising debt ratios in both the corporate and the private 
household sectors, which in turn seems to increase financial fragility. As recently observed by 
Palley (2008, p. 2) in his overview of financialisation in the US: ‘The last two decades have 
been marked by rapidly rising household debt-income ratios and corporate debt-equity ratios. 
These developments explain both the system’s growth and increasing fragility […]. The risk 
is when this happens the economy could be vulnerable to debt-deflation and prolonged reces-
sion.’  
While these observations may not look very new to adherers of Minsky’s financial fragil-
ity hypothesis (Minsky, 1975, 1982), the existing literature also shows that increasing lever-
age ratios and/or Tobin’s q are not inevitably associated with economic expansions. Rather, 
when the economy is ‘debt-burdened’, higher leverage ratios go in line with lower utilisation, 
profit and accumulation rates (see also Lavoie/Seccareccia, 2001). Similarly, as shown by 
Bhaduri/Laski/Riese (2006, p. 418), it is possible to perceive situations in which ‘the level of 
real income and, of virtual wealth may […] move in opposite directions’. Lavoie (1995) and 
Hein (2006, 2007, 2008c), referring to Steindl’s (1952) ‘paradox of debt’, also stress that in-
creasing interest or dividend obligations for firms may even be associated with exploding debt 
ratios, despite (or because of) their contractive effects on capacity utilisation and capital ac-
cumulation.    19
A different type of instability potentially linked to shareholder value orientation has re-
cently been highlighted by Cordonnier/Van de Velde (2008). They start their argument by 
noting that a larger (microeconomic) preference for profitability will induce a declining profit 
rate at the macroeconomic level (see Figure 2a). In a closed private economy, the only remedy 
to this macroeconomic realisation problem seems to be a higher rate of distributed profits 
which then stimulates consumption and hence profits. This, however, also requires higher 
leverage of firms, and as soon as lenders refuse to expand the flow of credit to firms, the 
process of adjusting the realised profit rate to shareholders’ target comes to an end. While 
Dallery/van Treeck (2008) have envisaged the possibility that, despite the failure to finally 
resolve this shareholder-creditor conflict, the economy converges to a steady state consistent 
with the maximum leverage ratio targeted by banks, Cordonnier/Van de Velde (2008, p. 14) 
point at the potentially ‘depressionary pathos of financialised capitalism’: When firms are 
systematically disappointed with their realised profit rate, they may become ever more selec-
tive in their investment projects in an attempt to move leftwards on their expansion frontier 
(see figure 1). This, however, may lead into a depressive spiral by further reducing aggregate 
demand and realised profitability. 
The bottom line is that ‘financialisation’ may be quite compatible with strong economic 
activity and may be very successful under certain conditions in providing firms with high 
profit rates. But the associated risks are equally obvious: Rising debt ratios in both the corpo-
rate and personal sectors may increase financial fragility, and when profitability claims by 
shareholders become overly demanding, the credit system may at some point refuse to ac-
commodate the associated rise in private debt ratios. 
 
4. Summary and conclusions 
In the present chapter we have reviewed the integration of ‘financialisation’ processes into 
Post-Keynesian distribution and growth models and distinguished three principal channels of   20
influence: 1. objectives and finance restrictions of firms, 2. new opportunities for households’ 
wealth-based and debt-financed consumption, and 3. distribution between capital and labour, 
on the one hand, and between management and workers, on the other hand. Starting from a re-
interpretation of the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm we have bridged the gap between mi-
cro- and macro-analysis of ‘financialisation’ and we have traced the main characteristics and 
effects of ‘financialisation’ from the micro to the macro level taking into account stock-flow 
interactions. Our review of the theoretical literature on ‘financialisation’ shows that expansive 
effects may arise under certain conditions, in particular when there are strong wealth effects in 
firms’ investment decisions (via Tobin’s q) and in households’ consumption decisions. How-
ever, our review also suggests that even an expansive finance-led economy may build up ma-
jor financial imbalances, i.e. increasing debt-capital or debt-income ratios, which make such 
economies prone to financial instability.  
Post-Keynesian models of growth and distribution, and in particular stock-flow consistent 
models, are well suited for an analysis of the complex interactions between the conflicting 
claims of shareholders, managers and workers, aggregate demand and the financial sphere of 
the economy. Given the renewed topicality of these issues, further research, both theoretical 
and empirical, is highly warranted. 
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